Abstract. In this paper we consider the fair division of chores (tasks that need to be performed by agents, with negative utility for them), and study the loss in social welfare due to fairness. Previous work has been done on this so-called price of fairness, concerning fair division of cakes and chores with non-connected pieces and of cakes with connected pieces. We provide tight or nearly tight bounds on the price of fairness in situations where each player has to receive one connected piece of the chores. We also give the first proof of the existence of equitable divisions for chores with connected pieces.
Introduction
Motivated by the fact that social interaction often requires dividing goods, researchers in economics, law and computer science dealt with fair division since the 1940's, and already the ancient Greeks knew the problem. In fair division, one tries to divide some desirable or undesirable good between a number of people that all have individual preferences and dislikes, while satisfying some fairness condition. We will only focus on the case where the goods are divisible, i.e. can be cut in arbitrary pieces; dividing indivisible goods is a much harder problem. The typical analogy for fair division when considering desirable goods is cake cutting [1] , meaning that we want to divide a cake that has various sections with different toppings, whereas in the chore division problem [2] one tries to minimize the discontent of the players when dividing work. Many algorithms found for cake cutting also apply to the division of chores, but interestingly, as we will see in this work their theoretical properties differ in several cases.
Of course one has to decide how to define fairness, and the three criteria proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability considered in many earlier papers (e.g. [3] , [4] , [5] ) will also be considered here. Informal definitions for these are given in the next paragraph. Apart from achieving a division which is fair, another goal is optimizing the social welfare, and the natural question arises what the trade-off between those two goals is. Caragiannis et al. [5] and Aumann and Dombb [4] examined this trade-off for the division of cakes and chores; Caragiannis et al. found bounds for this trade-off, called the price of fairness, for both cakes and chores, but without any restriction on the number of pieces each player receives. This may lead to the undesirable situation that players receive a huge number of small pieces, e.g. a bunch of crumbs in the cake analogy. Therefore, Aumann and Dombb [4] examined the price of fairness for connected pieces, requiring that every player receives exactly one connected part of the cake; however, they did not consider division of chores. To close the gap, in this paper we give bounds on the price of fairness with connected pieces in division of chores. An analogy for this could be that a group of gardeners needs to maintain a garden and each of them wants to be responsible for one connected area.
Model. In our model, the chores are represented by the real interval [0,1] and we consider n players. Each player has a disutility function over this interval that gives his discontent for a particular piece. These functions are required to be non-atomic measures, i.e. they are non-negative and additive and if an interval is valued strictly positive, it must have a subinterval that has a strictly less but still strictly positive value. Furthermore the functions are normalized, so the disutility for the whole chores is 1. The disutility of a player in a division is then the disutility of this player for the piece he receives. The utilitarian welfare for a division is defined as the sum over the disutilities of all players, while egalitarian welfare is the greatest disutility among all players (i.e. the disutility of the worst-off player). A division is called optimal if it minimizes the welfare. We call a division proportional if every player thinks that he receives his fair share, we call it envy-free if no player thinks that another player receives less than him, and equitable if the disutilities of all players are equal.
To quantify the loss in welfare due to fairness we use the notion of price of fairness. We define the price of fairness as the ratio between the welfare of the best fair division and the welfare of the optimal division.
Related Work
Modern mathematicians started working on the topic in the 1940's with Banach, Steinhaus and Knaster giving the "Last Diminisher" mechanism for proportional divisions [1] . In the following years, research mainly focused on finding algorithms for achieving fair divisions ( [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] ), also trying to bound the number of cuts required. Furthermore, Dubins and Spanier as well as Stromquist gave existence theorems for certain fair divisions [8] , [9] .
On the problem of fair division of chores however, much less work has been done. The problem was first mentioned by Gardner in [2] , and Oskui [3, p. 73] gave the first three person envy-free chore division algorithm. Peterson and Su gave envy-free protocols for four and later for n players [10] , [11] . The existence proof for proportional cake divisions of Steinhaus [1] can also be applied to chores. Su [12] has proven that envy-free divisions of chores with connected pieces also always exist. For the existence of equitable divisions with connected pieces, as far as we know no proof was given so far.
The problem of the efficiency of fair divisions was first addressed by Caragiannis et al. [5] . Their work considered the price of fairness for utilitarian welfare and the three fairness notions proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability, and examined bounds for these for divisible and indivisible cakes as well as chores. Aumann and Dombb [4] gave bounds for the price of fairness for utilitarian and egalitarian welfare, restricted to the case that only connected pieces are allowed to be given to the players so they do not end up with arbitrarily many pieces, but they only considered cake cutting. In this work we give bounds for the remaining case of chore division with connected pieces.
Following the work of Caragiannis et al. and Aumann and Dombb, Cohler et al. [13] provided a polynomial time approximation scheme for computing envyfree cake divisions that are optimal w.r.t. utilitarian welfare. Based on this work, Bei et al. [14] give a PTAS for computing optimal proportional cake divisions with connected pieces.
Brams et al. [15] connected the topic of efficient fair divisions with the sphere of Pareto-optimal divisions, i.e. divisions in which it is not possible to give one player a strictly higher utility while giving no player a lower utility. They examined whether we can always find fair divisions maximizing the (utilitarian) social welfare that are also Pareto-optimal and showed that for a special class of evaluation functions, the optimal (w.r.t. utilitarian welfare) equitable division has never a higher social welfare than the optimal envy-free division.
Overview of Results
We examine the price of fairness for utilitarian and egalitarian welfare and the three fairness notions proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability as a function of the number of players n. We give tight bounds for all cases except for the utilitarian price of proportionality, where there is still a small gap between the lower and the upper bound. All results are summarized and compared to the results by Caragiannis et al. [5] and Aumann and Dombb [4] in Table 1 .
For utilitarian welfare, we show that the price of proportionality is linear (between n/2 and n) in the number of players for n > 2. This matches the Θ(n) bounds for chore division with non-connected pieces by Caragiannis et al. [5] . For egalitarian welfare we show that there is no trade-off between proportionality and egalitarian welfare, which is the same result as shown by Aumann and Dombb [4] for cake cutting.
When considering the price of envy-freeness and more than two players, we show how to construct instances that have an arbitrarily high price of fairness. We hence see that for this fairness notion there is an inherent difference between cakes and chores (Aumann and Dombb [4] as well as Caragiannis et al. [5] found bounds for the price of envy-freeness for cake cutting).
Our proof is the first for the existence of equitable divisions of chores with connected pieces. We prove that the egalitarian price of equitability is 1 by constructing an equitable division starting with an egalitarian-optimal one. We also give a tight bound of n for the utilitarian price of equitability. For this, Aumann and Dombb [4] gave an upper bound of n and a lower bound of n−1+ Table 1 . Results of this work, compared to [5] and [4] . Some results only hold for n ≥ 3. See the text for the case n = 2.
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Definitions
In this section we formally define the chores division problem itself, the notions of fairness and social welfare used in this work and finally the price of fairness, the measure for the trade-off between fairness and social welfare. The chores are represented by the real interval [0, 1] and our players are denoted by 1, . . . , n. Each player i has a certain valuation function v i (·), that maps any possible subset of the chores to a real valuation between 0 and 1. This valuation function needs to be a non-atomic measure (i.e. non-negative, zero for the empty interval, additive and each interval with positive value must have a sub-interval with strictly less but strictly positive value) with v i (0, 1) = 1.
The point x i denotes the position of the i-th cut, we define x 0 := 0, x n := 1, and the cuts are sorted:
π is a permutation that denotes the assignment of the pieces to the players: Player i receives the interval (x π(i)−1 , x π(i) ). By X we denote the set of all possible divisions.
The unhappiness of the players with a certain division is given by the notion of disutility.
In this work, the following three different notions of fairness are considered.
Intuitively, a division is proportional if all players get a portion they consider their fair share of the chores (or less). A division is envy-free if no player envies any other player, in the sense that he dislikes the other player's piece less than his own piece. Note that every envy-free division is proportional. Finally, a division is equitable if the disutilities of all players are equal (by their own valuations).
The social welfare of a division can be defined in two ways: In utilitarian welfare, the total disutility of all players is considered, whereas egalitarian welfare refers to the disutility of the worst-off player.
and egalitarian social welfare eg(
To quantify the amount of social welfare one has to sacrifice to achieve fairness, we define the price of fairness:
Definition 5. The price of fairness (price of proportionality, respectively envyfreeness, equitability) is the minimal welfare achievable in fair (proportional, respectively envy-free, equitable) divisions divided by the minimal welfare achievable in arbitrary divisions.
For example the price of envy-freeness with egalitarian welfare is min x∈X EF eg(x) min x∈X eg(x) , where X EF denotes the set of all connected envy-free divisions.
The Price of Proportionality
We start with bounds for the price of proportionality. For utilitarian welfare, the results do not differ much from the results for non-connected chores by Caragiannis et al. [5] , although the lower bound is slightly better. Concerning egalitarian welfare, we can use a proof analogous to the proof by Aumann and Dombb for the price of proportionality with connected cakes [4] .
Utilitarian Welfare
Theorem 1. The utilitarian price of proportionality for the division of chores with connected pieces is lower-bounded by n 2 for n > 2.
We give no full proof here; it can be found in the full version. The idea is to construct an instance where one player, who dislikes the chores uniformly, receives a piece slightly greater than 1 n in the optimal division, and where it is very costly to give some part of this piece to any other player. Intuitively one could say that in this scenario one player "sacrifices" himself to do more work than his fair share (in terms of proportionality), as he himself does not dislike this work as much as the other players.
For two players, we only state the result; the proof is given in the full version.
Theorem 2. The utilitarian price of proportionality for n = 2 players is lowerbounded by 2.
For an upper bound on the utilitarian price of proportionality, we refer the reader to the proof by Caragiannis et al. [5] , as it also applies to connected chores.
Theorem 3. The utilitarian price of proportionality for the division of chores with connected pieces is upper-bounded by n.
In the case with two players, envy-free and proportional divisions coincide, hence these results immediately imply the following:
The utilitarian price of envy-freeness for n = 2 players is 2.
Egalitarian Welfare
For the egalitarian price of proportionality, we can again apply the result of Aumann and Dombb [4] .
Theorem 4. Every egalitarian-optimal division of chores with connected pieces is proportional, and therefore the egalitarian price of proportionality in this case is 1. For n = 2 players, this again also holds for the price of envy-freeness.
The Price of Equitability
The price of equitability is a more interesting case than proportionality, as so far no proof was given for the existence of equitable divisions of chores with connected pieces. In Theorem 5, we show that we can transform any egalitarianoptimal division into an equitable one with the same welfare, and with this, we give this existence proof and prove that no trade-off between equitability and egalitarian welfare exists. The construction relies on the fact that optimality with respect to egalitarian welfare and the non-atomicity of the evaluation measures imply that we can make pieces that are adjacent to a piece with maximal dislike (among all pieces) also maximal.
Afterwards we give proofs for a tight bound of n for utilitarian welfare. This matches the bound for non-connected chores given by Caragiannis et al. [5] .
Egalitarian Welfare
Theorem 5. For every instance of the chores division problem, there exists an equitable division with connected pieces. Furthermore, the egalitarian price of equitability for the division of chores with connected pieces is 1.
Proof. We need some more terminology for this proof:
-The value of a piece is the dislike that is assigned to this piece by the player who receives it. -Let m = min x∈X eg(x) be the optimal egalitarian welfare. Pieces that have a value of m are called maximal pieces. -A block of maximal pieces is sequence of one or more adjacent maximal pieces p 1 , . . . , p k where the left neighbor of p 1 and the right neighbor of p k are nonmaximal (i.e. a maximal sequence of maximal pieces). Those non-maximal neighbors are called neighbors of this block.
Consider an egalitarian-optimal division x that has the minimal number of maximal pieces among all egalitarian-optimal divisions. We want to make all pieces in x maximal by moving cuts, and for this we need a lemma, which is proven in the full version of the paper: Lemma 1. Consider a block of k maximal pieces. Then we can either make the right neighbor p of this block maximal as well or we can make all pieces in the block as well as p non-maximal by only moving the cuts inside the block and the cut between the block and p to the left.
The lemma can also be shown for the left neighbor symmetrically. Now consider our optimal division x and look at its left-most block of maximal pieces. Note that this block must exists, as at least one maximal piece must exist (by definition of maximal piece and optimality of x). By the lemma we can make its right neighbor maximal, as otherwise we could make the block non-maximal, contradicting the assumption that x has the minimal number of maximal pieces. By applying the lemma again and again, we can make all pieces to the right of this (steadily growing) left-most block maximal. Note that every time, if we find that we can make the entire block non-maximal, we find a division with less maximal pieces than x. If we reach a piece that is already maximal during this process, we just add it to the block without moving cuts. We can then apply the lemma symmetrically for the pieces to the left of this block (which is now the only block of maximal pieces in x) and make all of them maximal too. Finally we have a division where all pieces are maximal.
Utilitarian Welfare
While achieving equitability does not influence the egalitarian optimality, it has an impact on the utilitarian welfare, as shown in the next three theorems. The idea of the lower bound proof is to make sure that one indifferent player has to receive at least a piece of a certain value in both fair and unfair divisions, which leads to a price of fairness of n, as in equitable divisions all players have to receive this certain disutility, while the indifferent player is the only one to receive any disliked piece in the utilitarian-optimal division. Theorem 6. The utilitarian price of equitability is lower-bounded by n.
Proof. We construct an instance of the chores division problem that has a utilitarian price of equitability of at least n as follows:
Let > 0 be arbitrarily small. We create (n − 1) 2 so-called "disliked pieces" p 1 , . . . , p (n−1) 2 , where p i is located at (
We divide those pieces into (n − 1) blocks of n − 1 pieces each, and each block contains one piece for every player {1, . . . , n − 1}. The first piece of the first block is associated with player 1, the second with player 2 and so on, until the last piece of the first block is associated with player n − 1. The pieces of the second block are then associated with players 2, 3, . . . , n − 1, 1 (in this order), and so on. Generally, the pieces of the i-th block are associated with players i, i + 1, . . . , n − 1, 1, . . . , i − 1. Each player dislikes each piece associated with him as 1 n−1 and the rest of the chores as 0, which sums up to a total valuation of 1 for the entire chores for each of the first n − 1 players. Finally player n dislikes the entire chores uniformly. This construction is shown in figure 1 . Fig. 1 . Example construction for n = 4 players. The numbers above the columns denote the player this piece is associated with. Above the interval the optimal division is shown.
First, we want to upper bound the welfare in an optimal division of this instance (note that this is enough to give a lower bound on the price of fairness) and for this, take a look at the following division: we give the piece (0, n−1 (n−1) 2 +1 − ) to player n−1, the piece (
(n−1) 2 +1 − ) to player i for i = 1, . . . , n−2 and finally the piece (
We observe the following: For i = 1, . . . , n − 2 the i-th disliked piece of player i is at (
− ,
+ ) and the i + 1-st disliked piece of player i is at (
(n−1) 2 +1 + ). This follows by construction, as these pieces are the first piece of the i-th block, or the last piece of the i + 1-st block, respectively.
We conclude that the piece that is assigned to player i = 1, . . . , n−2 as above is between the i-th and i+1-st piece of this player. The piece player n−1 receives is before his first disliked piece. Hence, the disutility of the players 1, . . . , n−1 are all 0, as they all do not receive any of their disliked pieces. Player n's disutility is exactly the physical size of the piece he receives, so the utilitarian welfare in this division is u(x) = d n (x) = 1 − (
+ . This division for the example with n = 4 players can be seen in figure 1 . Now, we claim that the disutility of player n in any equitable division of the chores is at least 1 (n−1) 2 +1 − 2 . From this it follows that the utilitarian welfare in equitable divisions is at least n times as high, as all players must have the same disutility. Thus, the price of equitability is at least
+ . The bound follows as approaches 0.
It remains to show that indeed player n has to receive a disutility of at least 1 (n−1) 2 +1 − 2 in every equitable division. The idea behind this claim is that no player 1, . . . , n − 1 can receive a whole block of pieces without getting some positive disutility (as in every block there is one disliked piece of every player), and hence player n must get at least the slot between either two disliked pieces or the first (last) disliked piece and the left (right) end of the chores. The details of the proof can be found in the full version of the paper.
Proving a matching upper bound is simple when re-using Theorem 5, as we can use it to show that switching from an arbitrary to an equitable division does not increase the egalitarian welfare and hence the trivial bound eg(x) ≤ u(x) ≤ n · eg(x) can be applied. See the full version for the detailed proof.
Theorem 7. The utilitarian price of equitability is upper-bounded by n.
The Price of Envy-Freeness
Finally, we take a look at the price of envy-freeness. For this fairness notion, we get the most interesting deviation from former results on connected cakes and non-connected chores, as we can prove unboundedness of the price of fairness here (for more than two players). In contrast to the previous theorems, the arbitrary high price of fairness now does not result from giving an indifferent player more than his fair share in the optimal division, but from the fact that in the optimal division for the concrete instance given below, it is optimal to give the indifferent player no piece of the chores. But a situation where one player does not receive any piece in the optimal division has a negative effect on the price of envy-freeness, as every other player receiving a positive disutility will envy this player. By choosing the preferences in a certain way, we can make the price of envy-freeness arbitrarily high.
Theorem 8. The price of envy-freeness for the division of chores with connected pieces is unbounded for both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare for n > 2 players.
Proof. We use the same construction we used in the proof of Theorem 6 for the utilitarian price of equitability with other valuation functions. Again, let 0 < < 1 (n−1) 2 and consider (n − 1) 2 disliked pieces arranged in (n − 1) blocks as before, where piece p i is located at (
Call the first piece of each block "type A" piece, the other pieces "type B" pieces. The pieces are associated with players as before. Each player dislikes the only type A piece that is associated with him as 1 − (n − 2) , the (n − 2) type B pieces associated with him as and the rest of the chores as 0. Player n assigns a dislike of 1 (n−1) 2 to every disliked piece of either type and 0 to the rest. An example with 4 players can be seen in figure 2. in the last step of Theorem 6, we can argue that it is impossible to divide the chores between the first n − 1 players entirely without giving one player a piece he dislikes. We are always left with at least one disliked piece p that has to be assigned to one player among players 1, . . . , n − 1 who dislikes it > 0. Furthermore, this means we also have to give some piece to player n, as otherwise all players receiving a disutility > 0 envy n, and assigning n less than one half of p makes the player who receives the rest of p envy n. Thus, we can show that we cannot do better than giving n one half of p and another player i who also dislikes p the other half. Therefore, to achieve an optimal envy-free division we give players 1, . . . , n − 3, n − 1 the same pieces as in the non-envy-free division, the piece (n−2)(n−1)
(n−1) 2 +1 to player n − 2 and the piece (n−1) 2 (n−1) 2 +1 , 1 to player n, i.e. we split the type B piece that player n − 2 received in the optimal division between players n−2 and n. In this division x, d n−2 (x) = 2 and d n (x) = 1 2(n−1) 2 . As both get the same amount of player n−2's last disliked piece, n − 2 does not envy n any more. Furthermore, player n receives half of a disliked piece, whereas every other player receives more than one such piece, hence n does also not envy any other player. Players 1, . . . , n − 3, n − 1 have 0 disutility and therefore also envy no other player. Finally,
So finally we have a utilitarian price of envy-freeness of 
Conclusion
In this work we examined the decrease of social welfare due to fairness when dividing chores so that every player receives exactly one connected piece of the chores. We considered three important fairness criteria and two different social welfare functions and found tight bounds for almost all cases. For utilitarian welfare and proportionality or equitability the bounds are in Θ(n), for egalitarian welfare there is no trade-off for these two fairness criteria. For envy-freeness however, no bound exists for both welfare functions except for 2 players.
Upon finding that the price of envy-freeness for the division of chores is the only case that is unbounded, one could ask the question why there is such a fundamental difference between envy-freeness and the other two fairness notions, and why this difference does not appear when considering cakes (Aumann and Dombb [4] and Caragiannis et al. [5] gave bounds for this case). The answer for the first question lies in the inherent difference between envy-freeness and the other two fairness notions, namely that only the first relies on the valuation of a player for pieces other than his own. The difference between chores and cakes seems to arise from the different nature of the two problems: Infinite envy always results from one player receiving no piece of the cake/chores, which isat least in some instances -desirable in chores division (see proof of Theorem 8), but undesirable when dividing cakes. This difference can also be seen in the results for indivisible cakes and chores by Caragiannis et al. [5] , where the price of envy-freeness is bounded for cakes and unbounded for chores.
Some questions still remain open. For the setting where non-connected pieces are allowed, Caragiannis et al. [5] only considered utilitarian welfare. Bounding the egalitarian price of fairness for non-connected divisions of cakes and chores could be examined. Furthermore, Caragiannis et al. [5] provided an analysis of the price of fairness for indivisible cakes and chores, but again they only considered utilitarian welfare. Further research could investigate the impact of fairness on egalitarian welfare for this setting.
